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IDENTIFYING UNSOUNDNESS OF CALL GRAPHS IN
ANDROID STATIC ANALYSIS TOOLS
DANA ALJAWDER
ABSTRACT
Analysis techniques are used to test mobile applications for bugs or malicious
activity. Market operators such as Google and Amazon use analysis tools to scan
applications before deployment. Creating a call graph is a crucial step in many of
the static analysis tools for Android applications. Each edge in a call graph is a
method call in the application. A sound call graph is one that contains all method
calls of an application. The soundness of the call graph is critical for accurate anal-
ysis. Unsoundness in the call graph would render analysis of the application flawed.
Therefore, any conclusions drawn from an unsound call graph could be invalid.
In this project, we analyze the soundness of static call graphs. We propose and
develop a novel approach to automatically identify unsoundness. We create a dynamic
call graph to examine the soundness of the static call graph. We map the edges of the
two graphs. Any edge observed dynamically but not present in the static call graph
is a witness for unsoundness. We show that there are edges in the dynamic call graph
that are not contained in the static call graph. We analyze 92 applications to find
a total of 19,653 edges missed by a state-of-the-art static analysis tool. To further
analyze these edges, our tool categorizes them into groups that can help identify the
type of method call that was missed by the static analysis tool. These categories
pinpoint where further research efforts are necessary to improve current state-of-the-
art static analysis capabilities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We rely heavily on mobile applications to enhance our daily lives. Smart devices and
mobile applications are increasingly becoming more the tool of today’s connectivity
with the external world for leisure, social and business transactions. They legiti-
mately store, manage and transmit vast amounts of sensitive personal data. Sensitive
data can range from a phone’s unique identifier, personal information, geographical
locations, emails, banking transactions, and government transactions. Klieber et al.
(2014); McClurg et al. (2013).
Mobile applications are offered through App Stores. Uploading mobile applica-
tions to App Stores is as easy as creating an account. This happens to be the minimum
requirement to submit an application to the official Android market (Google Play)
Android (2016). According to Ben EvansEvans (2015), the number of applications
downloaded from Google Play increased from 32 million to 50 million from 2013 to
2015. More than 80% of mobile applications in Google Play are offered free of charge
which could explain the rise in the number of applications downloaded.
The enhancements that mobile applications provide us come at a price. In May,
2015, the MIT Technology Review wrote about the perils of Google Play’s ”lighter
touch in vetting apps” Review (2015). The fact that devices and applications are
storing, managing and transmitting such sensitive data and information made the
devices targets for attacks by malicious applications. These attacks have drawn at-
tention and action from industry and research communities to deal with the issue of
1
2data leaks, that is, sensitive data transmitted by the device over the Internet or via
SMS to unintended destinations and parties or stored in publicly accessible storage
Arzt et al. (2014); Backes et al. (2015); Chin et al. (2011); Li et al. (2014).
Large application development companies and App Stores like Google Play and
Amazon use analysis techniques to test mobile applications for bugs or malicious
activity before deployment. There are two classes of application analysis: static and
dynamic. Static analysis is performed on an application when it is not running and
dynamic analysis while it is running. Both techniques are used to find vulnerabilities
or malicious activities. An analysis tool is considered sound when the results produce
no false negatives. The tool is considered complete when the results produce no false
positives. For example, a tool that detects information leaks is sound when no leaks
are missed and complete when it does not falsely report a leak.
Ideally an analysis tool would be sound and complete to ensure the full detection of
data leaks or malicious behaviors. Rice’s Theorem Rice (1953) states that for any non-
trivial program property, such as soundness or completeness, no general automated
method can determine whether or not this property holds. This means that a sound
and complete tool cannot be automated. Previous work extends or improves existing
static analysis tools so that it can be more sound. In this paper we look to identify
unsoundness in existing static analysis tools. Reducing the number of false negatives
produced from an analysis reduces the risk of a malicious or vulnerable application
passing as benign. We aim to pinpoint weaknesses in the tools themselves.
A call graph, CG = (V,E), is a graph that represents method calls of an applica-
tion. Each vertex, V, in the graph is a method and each edge, E, is a method call. A
sound call graph is one that contains all edges of an application. Unsoundness in the
call graph would render analysis of the application flawed and any conclusions drawn
from the call graph could be invalid. For example, if an analysis tool unknowingly
3uses an unsound call graph to identify whether a certain series of method calls exists
in a program, and an edge within the series is missed due to unsoundness in the call
graph, the analysis will incorrectly report that the series does not exist in the pro-
gram. In this project, we use dynamic analysis to identify edges that are missed in the
call graphs in static analysis. Any edge found dynamically which is not found in the
static call graph will be proof of unsoundness. We developed a tool, EdgeAnalyzer,
that compares a call graph created by a static analysis tool to a call graph created
dynamically to find and categorize missed edges.
We modified a static analysis tool to extract its call graph, used dynamic analysis
to extract a dynamic call graph, and used EdgeAnalyzer on a group of real world
applications. We show that there are a number of categories of missed edges from
the static call graph. EdgeAnalyzer automatically identifies the areas a static tool
will need to improve on to increase the soundness of its analysis.
The contributions we make in this thesis are as follows:
1. Develop and evaluate a system that automatically identifies and categorizes
edges missing from the call graph in static analysis tools.
2. Use a state of the art static analysis tool to demonstrate the effectiveness of our
system.
3. Analyze the results to examine causes for the identified unsoundness of call
graphs.
4Chapter 2
Background & Motivation
2.1 Background
In this chapter we discuss the Android platform, analysis techniques and their related
issues.
2.1.1 Android Environment
Prior to delving into the specifics of how Android applications function and the com-
plexity that could result in malicious or unintended activity occurrences, the following
is a brief description of the Android environment and its framework.
Android is an open source, mobile operating system based on Linux. It is a soft-
ware stack of the following five layered components (refer to the Android architecture
diagram in Figure 2·1) Enck et al. (2014); Sharma (2011).
1. Kernel. At the base of the software stack is the Kernel which acts as an abstrac-
tion layer of the hardware providing a standard interface between the hardware
and the Android software stack.
2. Android Runtime. This layer includes the Dalvik Virtual Machine, which has
been replaced by Android Runtime (ART) since version 5.0. Both ART and
Dalvik compile the bytecode of an application into native code. Dalvik uses
a just-in-time (JIT) compiler where ART uses an ahead-of-time (AOT) com-
piler. In this project we focus on the Dalvik Virtual Machine where the Dalvik
5bytecode is compiled at runtime.
3. Libraries. The layer consists of Android native libraries written in C/C++,
including Surface Manager to manage the user interface, Media Framework to
support various media formats, System C Libraries, and SQLite.
4. Application Framework. This layer offers developers APIs to allow for inter-
action with the libraries in the lower layer. Included in these APIs are the
Activity Manager which manages various stages of the application life cycle,
the Notification Manager to enable the creation of customized alerts, the View
System to create layouts and many more.
5. Applications. The top layer of these components is the application layer. This
layer manages the applications running on a device to allow them to communi-
cate with the application framework layer.
2.1.2 Android Applications
Application Components
Android applications consist of any of four components which are the basic units of an
Android application; activities, services, content providers, and broadcast receivers.
An activity is a graphical user interface (GUI) of an application. It provides the user
with an interface to enable interaction, for example requesting a list of the contacts
available on the device. Each activity is a separate interface. An application usually
has more than one activity. A service is a task that runs in the background in parallel
to other application tasks. An example of a service is a music application playing
music in the background while the user is browsing the Internet. A content provider
is a database for internal data storage and is a standard interface for data exchange
between inter-application and intra-application components. A broadcast receiver
6Figure 2·1: Diagram of Android Architecture EazyTutz (2015)
7receives and reacts to broadcast messages from other components or the system. The
broadcast messages allow developers to trigger events based on the message received.
For example, if the music application that is playing music in the background receives
a message from the device about an incoming phone call, the developers can use this
event to pause the music until the application receives a message that the call has
ended. Developers describe these four components of their applications in the manifest
file of the application (i.e., AndroidManifest.xml).
Entry Points
Each of the four components has several entry points. An android application does
not have one standard start method. In other words, the start of an execution of an
application differs. Each entry point can serve as a starting point of an execution.
Figure 2·2 shows the lifecycle of an activity. The square rectangles in the diagram
represent the entry point of an activity component. Android applications are event
driven which makes reasoning about the possible order of execution difficult.
Android APK file
Android Application Package(APK) is the file format used to distribute and install
applications onto the Android operating system. The APK file is a compressed zip
file that contains the compiled program classes, resources and assets, certificates and
the manifest file Android (2016).
Application Manifest File
Android application’s manifest file is the configuration file of an application Chin
et al. (2011). Since the file declares the application’s four components as mentioned
earlier, it is important to note that the interactions of components and listeners can
be retrieved from this file Android (2016). Additionally, the manifest file contains
8Figure 2·2: Lifecycle of an activity Android (2016)
9permissions granted to the application. For an application to be able to use system
resources, such as the device’s camera, the permissions need to be set and the user
must accept the permissions on installation.
Application Layout files
The application layout files define the user interface of the application. They contain
the definition of the format of the screen’s layout. Elements in the layout, such as
buttons, can have their properties defined in the layout file. Properties of a layout
element can include size, position, color, and a method for a click action. The user
interface layout could be declared in one of two ways; using XML or be instantiated
during runtime. For example, the method to be called when a button is clicked can
be defined in either the XML file or the Java code.
2.1.3 Android Application Security
Each Android application on a device is granted a user ID (UID) upon installation.
The UID is used to set file permissions to the application the way that Linux does.
Therefore if the UID is granted read/write permissions to folder ”foo”, then the
application has these permissions. The permissions granted to the application in the
AndroidManifest.xml file allow the application to interact with system components.
For example, if an application requires access to the device’s camera, the permission
to access the camera is set in the manifest file. These permissions must be accepted
by the user on installation, otherwise the application will not be installed.
2.1.4 Program Analysis
In program analysis there are two well-known classes of techniques researchers and
developers use to detect and protect against vulnerabilities and malicious activities.
They are static analysis and dynamic analysis.
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Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis is used to detect applications’ vulnerabilities and data leaks at run-
time by executing and monitoring applications’ behaviors. Dynamic analysis tools
can monitor control flows and data flows of sensitive data and critical services such as
connection to remote servers or sending SMSs and report any detected vulnerabilities
Spreitzenbarth et al. (2015). As such, analysis of applications requires contextual
information about user input, data sources and destinations. Not all parts of an
application will be executed in the case of dynamic analysis since contextual infor-
mation is limited by the specific instance of the execution Enck et al. (2014); Li et al.
(2014). Since the analysis occurs at runtime, the details of the run are precise. Any
statement made about the program based on the analysis will only be valid for the
specific run. Obfuscated code is code that is deliberately written in a way that is not
human understandable. Obfuscation techniques can hide system activities by calling
functions outside the Dalvik/Java runtime library Spreitzenbarth et al. (2015). In
contrast to static analysis, in the case of obfuscation techniques, dynamic analysis
handles these techniques well, but a weakness of dynamic analysis is that it can be
detected and avoided by malware applications as they execute Octeau et al. (2013).
Static Analysis
The term static analysis is used to describe a mechanism of analyzing applications
that are not running. A static analysis tool takes the code of an application, analyzes
the content of the code based on the criteria developed for the tool Chess and McGraw
(2004). For example, data-flow based analysis will attempt to map all the possible
data flows of an application. Static analysis can be used to make statements about
entire programs. In other words, the statements made about a program are valid
for all executions of the program. For example, if static analysis is used to detect
11
memory leaks Xie and Aiken (2005), the tool should be able to report that a program
has no memory leaks.
Call graph
Many static analysis tools use call graphs as a crucial element in analyzing applica-
tions. A call graph, CG=(V,E), is a directed graph with methods as vertices V and
method calls as edges E. The edge’s vertices are the current method of the applica-
tion, caller, as the source and the method to be called, callee, as the target. Call
graphs map the paths of the methods called in a program. A static call graph maps
the possible method calls. This is meant to ensure the soundness of a graph, that
is, all possible function calls in the application will be mapped in the call graph. As
a result some edges included in the static call graph may not actually exist in the
application itself Chugunov et al. (2002).
Soundness
The output of static analysis tools can produce false positives and false negatives.
False positives are occurrences where the tool falsely flags an application as vulnerable
or malicious. False negatives are occurrences where the tool falsely flags an application
as secure. A false negative is dangerous since it gives a false sense of security. Static
analysis is said to be sound with respect to a certain property if there are no false
negatives. In the context of call graphs and this thesis, we specify the property to be
The method call is represented in the call graph. In other words, a call graph is sound
when every method call is represented by an edge in the call graph. A trivial solution
that would render a call graph sound is creating a fully connected graph. That is
a graph where all vertices are mutually connected. The fully connected graph will
guarantee that all method calls are represented in the call graph. The graph will also
contain method calls that do not exist in the application (false positives). A large
12
number of false positives will render the call graph useless. Sifting through the graph
to manually verify the edge’s existence will be the only way to derive meaning from
a fully connected graph.
Completeness
An analysis is considered complete when it contains no false positives. The results of a
complete analysis are always true but do not necessarily reflect the entire application.
In the context of call graphs with respect to our property, a call graph is complete
when every edge in the call graph represents a valid method call in the application.
In other words, there are no edges in the call graph that represent a method call
that does not exist in the application. A trivial solution to render a complete graph
is by creating a disconnected graph, that is a graph with no edges connecting its
vertices. The disconnected graph will guarantee no false edges in the call graph. The
disconnected graph is useless as it does not give any information about the application.
Soundiness
In this thesis, we focus on soundness of call graphs so it is necessary to understand
the difficulties in producing sound analysis that does not render the analysis useless.
As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, we say an analysis is sound if there are no
false negatives and an analysis is precise (or complete) if there are no false positives.
”In Defense of Soundiness: A Manifesto” discusses the idea that the results of static
analysis tools cannot be made sound without compromising scalability and/or preci-
sion Livshits et al. (2015). The authors believe that soundness in static analysis is
unachievable. Their ”Manifesto” advocates ”Soundy” analysis, that is, analysis that
attempts to ”do the right thing”. In their view the right thing is to be as sound
as possible while not sacrificing scalability and/or precision and achieving the bal-
ance between over-approximation and intentional under-approximation. They also
13
see the need for some efforts to compare the results of an unsound analysis (static)
and dynamic analysis results.
2.2 Motivation
We know that the complexity of the Android Framework contributes to the difficulty
in making static analysis sound. Many static analysis tools use a call graph as the
crucial component of the analysis of Android applications Arzt et al. (2014); Barros
et al. (2015); Chin et al. (2011); Li et al. (2014). For a call graph to be sound, all
edges in the application must be contained in this call graph. An unsound call graph
will render any assumptions made based on its soundness invalid.
Therefore we wanted to develop a tool that can automatically find edges missed
in a static call graph and then classify these missed edges. The idea is to find classes
of edges that are missed in creating the static call graphs. In other words, we would
like to show that static call graphs have various classes of edges missing and provide
a tool that can automatically find and classify edges missed in the creation of the
call graph in static analysis tools. We want this tool to pinpoint possible areas for
improving soundness of static analysis tools.
14
Chapter 3
Approach
As explained in the previous chapter, the goal of this project is to identify the missing
edges in a static call graph. We use a static analysis tool to extract the static call graph
and a modified version of the AOSP (Android Open Source Project) to dynamically
trace all function calls within an application. We then map the edges found during
static analysis to those found during dynamic analysis. All the edges that belong
to the dynamic call graph that are not contained in the static call graph are then
categorized. To automate the mapping and categorization, we developed a system
that combines these steps to give a final output with the statistics and details of
the categories of the missed edges. Figure 3·1 shows an overview of how our system
works. In the following sections we describe each of the steps mentioned.
3.1 Static Call Graph
Static analysis of Android applications attempts to capture a program behavior by
analyzing its code. To create a call graph, the analysis tool must map out all possible
method calls. As stated in Chapter 2.1.4, the call graph is sound if every method call
is represented in the call graph. Based on the assumption that the static call graph is
sound, it should contain all the possible function calls in the application. If the call
graph does not, then it is unsound. To determine the unsoundness in the call graphs
created by static analysis tools, we need a way to extract the static call graph. The
idea behind this step is to modify the static analysis tool such that we can save the
15
Figure 3·1: System Overview
call graph created in order to use it in later stages of the analysis.
3.2 Dynamic Call Graph
We focus on the soundness of the call graph created by the static analysis tool.
To assess the soundness of the static call graph, we need to create a dynamic call
graph and compare the two graphs. Dynamic analysis of Android applications cannot
provide sound results as the analysis will only be performed on the specific run. In
other words, not all method calls in the application will be in the call graph. Despite
the fact that a vulnerability or malicious activity caught by dynamic analysis is
correct, a complete set of vulnerabilities/malicious activities is not guaranteed. The
results of the analysis will be based on the specific instance of the execution.
To create the dynamic call graph, we install an Android application on an emu-
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lator that runs a modified version of AOSP. This version logs method calls for user
installed applications. When an application is run on a framework such as Android,
the system differentiates between its own factory installed applications and user in-
stalled applications using a UID (Refer to Chapter 2.1.3). We use the UID to identify
the methods that belong to the installed application. We need to be able to make the
distinction of whether an application is factory installed or user installed to be able to
only log the methods of the user installed applications. The distinction is important
because before a user installed application is started, the mobile phone’s operating
system uses factory installed applications to simulate actions such as opening the
phone’s menu or selecting an application to start. Logging method calls that we do
not require, such as method calls of factory installed applications, would take extra
space.
The logging functionality should output a call graph. The modified version of
AOSP logs every method call made during the execution of an application to a file.
To create a call graph, the file includes the current method and the method to be
called (caller and callee respectively). Since this dynamic call graph will be based on
a specific instance of execution, we cannot guarantee that all methods will be called
but we will know that the information logged is factual.
3.3 Mapping
We state that any edge observed dynamically but not present in the static call graph
is a witness for unsoundness. We define the sets as follows:
CGs = (Vs, Es)
CGd = (Vd, Ed)
W = {e ∈ Ed | e /∈ Es}
17
where CGs is the static call graph, Vs is the set of vertices of the static call graph, Es
is the set of edges of the static call graph, CGd is the dynamic call graph, Vd is the
set of vertices of the dynamic call graph, Ed is the set of edges of the static dynamic
graph, and W is the lower bound on the set of witnesses of unsoundness. Based on
the assumption that the static call graph is sound, all the edges found dynamically
should belong to the set of edges found statically, and similarly for all vertices. In
other words:
Vd ⊆ Vs
Ed ⊆ Es
which would imply that
W = ∅
If we find thatW is not empty, then the static call graph is unsound.
To be able to map the static call graph to the dynamic call graph, we require both
call graphs. By traversing the dynamically created call graph, comparing edges to
their equivalent edges in the static call graph, we can ensure every edge is contained
in the static graph. Once an edge in the dynamic call graph is not found in the static
call graph we log this edge to a list. At the end of this mapping phase, we will have
a list that contains the edges found dynamically but missed statically.
Chapter 4
Implementation
Our tool, EdgeAnalyzer, uses a call graph created in static analysis tools and a call
graph created by using dynamic analysis to compare and find edges missed stati-
cally. In both call graphs, each method is a vertex in the graph and the vertices are
connected to create the edges. The edges represent method calls.
4.1 Static Analysis
EdgeAnalyzer was developed independent of any static analysis tool. EdgeAnalyzer
can accept input from any static analysis tool in the form of a call graph. We de-
cided to use FlowDroid as our static analysis tool as it is a state of the art precise
context, flow, field, object-sensitive and lifecycle-aware static analysis tool for An-
droid applications Arzt et al. (2014). One of the advantages of using FlowDroid is
that it is an open-source tool. To be able to analyze the data from FlowDroid’s
call graph, we modified its source code to export the call graph to a file. The
file follows the format of a dot file GraphViz (2016). The format of the edges
in the FlowDroid call graph follows the Java method signature formatting. Fig-
ure 4·1 shows an example of a method signature in FlowDroid’s call graph. The
method dispatchActivityCreated belongs to the class Application and takes as
input two parameters of type android.app.Activity and android.os.Bundle. The
Application class belongs to the android.app package.
FlowDroid takes an apk file as input. The apk file is unzipped and the manifest,
18
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android.app.Application: void
dispatchActivityCreated(android.app.Activity,android.os.Bundle)
Figure 4·1: Example of method signature in FlowDroid’s call graph
1 List<SootMethod> ePoints = Scene.v().getEntryPoints();
2 visit(Scene.v().getCallGraph(), ePoints.get(0));
3 dot.plot("soot_callGraph"+ dot.DOT_EXTENSION);
Figure 4·2: Code addition to RunAnalysis in Infoflow.java
dex, and layout files are parsed. Flowdroid then uses the three files to create a call
graph using a modified version of a tool named soot Valle´e-Rai et al. (1999). To
extract the call graph, we modified the RunAnalysis method in the Infoflow class
of FlowDroid. The method RunAnalysis builds the call graph, initializes the flow
analysis, finds the sources and sinks in the application and finds flows. A source in
this case is an entry point to a component, and a sink is a point where data can
be leaked. We added a method named visit that traverses the call graph created
by soot. FlowDroid recursively finds the entry points of an application and adds
them to the call graph. visit starts at any entry point of the application. The call
graph should contain all entry points and therefore we do not need to identify all
the entry points, one is enough to start the process. As it traverses the call graph,
visit writes every edge into the dot file. We modify RunAnalysis at the point after
the call graph is constructed and before the flow analysis begins (See Figure 4·2 for
the added code). Flow analysis is expensive and not required for the call graph Arzt
et al. (2014). Thus, we can omit this expensive analysis for our purposes.
4.2 Dynamic Analysis
We used version 4.3 r1 of the AOSP to build our own version that creates a dynamic
call graph. We modified the code to log every function call invoked by a running user
20
application to a log file. The same code we modified can be used for any version of
the Android source code below 5.0. The reason this code will not work for Android
version 5.0+ is that Android abandoned the Dalvik architecture and moved to ART
(See Chapter 2.1.1).
There are three execution modes for the Dalvik VM; fast, portable and JIT(Just
In Time) Android (2016). Portable is implemented purely in C++ and is not platform
specific so is expected to run on multiple platforms. On the other hand, fast and
JIT incorporate assembly and are platform specific. The semantics of all three are
the same. We opted to modify the C++ files related to the portable execution of the
Dalvik VM. When a method is invoked in an application, the Android framework
calls a series of C++ methods to process and set the parameters. There are five types
of method calls: invoke-static, invoke-virtual, invoke-super, invoke-direct,
and invoke-interface. invoke-static is used to call a class method without a ref-
erence to a class object. invoke-virtual is used to call a class method with reference
to an object of the class type. In other words, invoke-virtual requires an instance
of an object to be called. invoke-direct invokes any of static, private, or constructor
without an instance of the class object. A private method is a method that can only
be accessed by methods in the same class. invoke-interface requires an instance
of an object and is used when the reference is of an interface type. An interface type
method call is one who’s parent method is an abstract method. invoke-super is
used when calling methods using super. super is used to call a method from the
parent class of the current class. Each of these method types has its own opcode and
format. We need to be able to log all methods regardless of method call type.
In the source code of the Dalvik portable, all five method call types are processed
by the invokeMethod method. We modified this particular method to first check
whether we are inside a user installed application. We use the getuid() method to
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retrieve the integer that represents the application ID granted to the application upon
installation. The UIDs for user installed applications are within a known range. We
manually checked the UID of the first user installed application on our emulator and
the number was 10046. To ensure we log the methods of user installed applications
we check that the UID is greater than 10045 (see Figure 4·2). Using invokeMethod,
we capture the information of the function call that is about to be made. This
information is used to create the dynamic call graph. We achieve this by making the
source of our dynamic call graph’s edge the current method that is being processed
(curMethod), and the target the method to be called (methodToCall); each of these
variables is of type Method. The information extracted from these variables includes
the full signature of each method (See Figure 4·2 for a snippet of the added code).
The full signature of a method consists of the method name, the class it belongs to,
the return variable type and the parameter types (see Figure 4·1 for an example).
Additionally, the type of the call about to be made is analyzed and tagged with
a category. There are two elements that interact via method calls to render an
application and its functionality; the application code and the framework code. These
two elements interact within themselves and with each other. Therefore, we divided
the calls into four categories: within the framework, within the application, from the
framework to the application, and from the application to the framework. We discuss
these categories further in the categorization section of this chapter (Chapter 4.4). We
write the source method and the target method as an edge with their categorization
tag to the log file.
Figure 4·3 shows the format of a method signature in bytecode. The method
dispatchActivityCreated is the same method shown in Figure 4·1. The format of
the edges logged in this stage makes use of bytecode method signature. In Android,
primitive types directly contain values and non-primitive types are references to ob-
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Landroid/app/Application; dispatchActivityCreated
(Landroid/app/Activity;Landroid/os/Bundle;)V
Figure 4·3: Example of bytecode method signature
1 if ((int)getuid() > 10045)
2 {
3 char *methodToCallDesc =
4 dexProtoCopyMethodDescriptor(&methodToCall->prototype);
5 char *curMethodDesc =
6 dexProtoCopyMethodDescriptor(&curMethod->prototype);
7
8 fprintf(self->logfile,"%c %s %s %s -> %s %s %s \n",contextDir,
9 curMethod->clazz->descriptor,curMethod->name,curMethodDesc,
10 methodToCall->clazz->descriptor,methodToCall->name,
11 methodToCallDesc);
12 }
Figure 4·4: Code addition to Dalvik in AOSP where contextDir is
the preliminary categorization and 10045 is specific to the emulator
instance we used.
jects. Primitive types in Android are represented by a single character. Non-primitive
types are represented by the character L Android (2016) and have their class names
in a variable in the C++ code. We retrieve the class names from the variables when
required.
4.3 Mapping the Call Graphs
The dot file and the log file, are then parsed and each edge from the log file has
its vertex’s format modified to FlowDroid’s method signature (see Figure 4·1). The
tool takes 4 inputs, the log file, the dot file, the application’s package name, and a
number we will call traceback. The traceback number is used to back track through
the dynamic graph when a missed edge is found. The traceback number represents
the number of edges leading to a missed edge to be recorded. The trace of edges that
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lead to the missed edge is logged to a file. We use this information to manually trace
individual missed edges to help in their analysis.
The method signatures from the log file need to have their format altered to match
the method representation from FlowDroid which is the same as Java’s representa-
tion. The log file extracted from the emulator has its vertices (methods) formatted
following Android’s method and class representation. We chose FlowDroid’s instead
of Android’s formatting because it is human-readable.
We used the org.jgrapht package to manage the graphs in Java. Each graph
object, the static and dynamic, is created by reading the file, formatting the vertex
if required, and adding the vertices and edges to the respective graph object.
Once both call graph objects have been populated, the tool traverses the dynamic
call graph and compares its edges to the static one. We do this by initially trying to
find the source vertex of the dynamic graph in the static graph using org.jgrapht’s
containsVertex method (See Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Find Missed Edges
1: procedure MapGraphs
2: for each vertex v ∈ dynamicGraph do
3: if staticGraph.containsVertex (v) then
4: for each edge e ∈ dynamicGraph.incomingEdges(v) do
5: if dynamicGraph.getEdge(e) = NULL then
6: MissingEdges←e.
7: else
8: for each edge e ∈ dynamicGraph.incomingEdges(v) do
9: MissingEdges←e.
At the end of this process we will have a Java List of edges that are in the
dynamic graph but missing from the static graph. In creating the dynamic call
graph, we labeled the edges with one of the four main categories. The tool filters out
the edges that are contained within the Android framework. However, we do take
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into consideration edges with a source as a method from the application and target
as a method from the framework and vice versa. An edge with a source as a method
from the framework and target as a method from the application could potentially be
a callback. A callback is any method that is called by another method which takes
the first method as a parameter. In this case the first method would be a method in
the application and the second a method from the framework.
When a missed edge is going to be added to the list, we use the traceback number,
the dynamic graph and the source vertex to create a log of traced back edges that
led up to this missing edge. We traverse the graph backward starting at the source
vertex and record each edge. Once the traversal is complete, we log the missed edge
with its incoming path. When the tool has completed, this file will contain all the
missed edges and their log of traced back edges.
4.4 Categorization
Once the entire dynamic call graph has been traversed, the results of the saved missed
edges are analyzed. As previously mentioned, there are two elements that interact via
method calls in an application; the application code and the framework code. Based
on these two elements we create the following four categories:
1. Edges that are within the application itself
2. Edges that are within the framework
3. Edges that originate from the application and terminate in the framework
4. Edges that originate from the framework and terminate in the application
Edges within the application represent calls of methods that are found in the appli-
cation’s APK file, that is, the source and target vertices are from methods found in
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the APK file. The methods that could be found in the APK file include methods
developed for this application and 3rd party libraries imported into this application.
Android applications are developed in Java. In other words, the framework is divided
into two parts; the Java framework and the Android framework, where the Android
framework handles Android specific features such as the components. Edges within
the framework represent interactions of methods that belong to the Android frame-
work or the Java framework, that is, the source and target vertices are from methods
that belong to either the Android framework or the Java framework. An example
of an intra-framework method call would be a method from the Java ThreadLocal
class calling a method from the Java Thread class to set the current thread. Edges
that go from the application to the framework represent edges with a source vertex
from the methods found in the APK file and a target vertex of a method belonging
to the Android or Java framework. An example would be a method call from an
instantiated int object calling the Java toString() method. Edges that go from
the framework to the application represent edges with a source vertex of a method
belonging to the Android or Java framework and a target vertex from the methods
found in the APK file. The edges from framework to application represent callbacks
where the framework calls a method in the application. An example would be when
an application sets the OnClickListener, which is an event triggered method, to a
method within the application. When the event is triggered, the framework calls the
method set in the listener.
The next step is adding sub-categories to refine our results. To explain the rea-
soning behind our sub-categorization, we first look into the package, class, method
hierarchy. Figure 4·5 is an example of possible interactions within a package. A pack-
age may contain multiple classes, in this example Class1 and Class2. In each class,
there can be multiple methods. Each method can interact with methods within its
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Figure 4·5: Hierarchy of an Application Package
own class and with methods in different classes.
Figure 4·6 shows an overview of how an application with multiple packages inter-
acts with the framework. Based on these interactions, we decided on sub-categories.
For the framework, we split the related categories into Java framework and Android
framework. For the application we split them into edges that remain in the same class
and edges who’s target class differs from the source class. The class split was done to
be able to identify different method calls within the application. Any edge that does
not belong to the list of categories is added to an uncategorized list. Ultimately, the
goal is to have no edges added to the uncategorized list.
To eliminate the uncategorized edges, we iteratively added new sub-categories.
The first sub-category we added was to the category of within an application. Appli-
cations may use multiple packages or package names (see Figure 4·6), so we added a
sub-category of package to package. Packages may be imported into an application as
an entire project, as bytecode or they are dynamically loaded at runtime. For exam-
ple, advertising packages are imported into an application as a third party package.
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Figure 4·6: Interaction between Application and Framework
During a separate iteration, we decided to distinguish Google’s advertising packages
from other external packages as it is the most popular advertising library Viennot
et al. (2014). By the end of the iterative process, the only values we found in the
uncategorized list were from imported packages interacting with the framework. We
added the two sub-categories package to framework and framework to package. This
resulted in no edges in the uncategorized list.
We tagged the edges in the dynamic call graph with the main categories (see
Chapter 4.2). The tool traverses the list of missed edges and places them in the
correct sub-category based on the package names of the source vertex method and
target vertex method. For example, an edge who’s source method belongs to package
Package.example, where Package.example is the application’s main package name,
and target method belongs to java.lang will belong to the sub-category applica-
tion to Java framework. Each sub-category has its own Java list. The application’s
package name is used in this step to identify the methods/classes that belong to this
application and ones that are imported. Once all edges have been categorized, the
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lists of categories and their edges are written to a JSON file. This file is the final
output of EdgeAnalyzer. It contains the statistics of each category with the missing
edges grouped by category per application.
To collect statistics on multiple applications, we implemented a JSON parser in-
dependent of EdgeAnalyzer. We named the statistics collector statTool. statTool
takes as its input the location of a directory and then traverses the directory looking
for the JSON files created by EdgeAnalyzer. Each JSON file statTool finds gets
parsed to find the number of edges missed per category. statTool also keeps track of
the number of applications that miss particular categories. Once all the JSON files
in the directory have been parsed, it outputs the statistics of the overall analysis.
Chapter 5
Evaluation
To evaluate this project we answer the following questions:
1. How unsound are static call graphs?
2. How widespread are missed edges in real world applications?
3. What does categorization of missed edges reveal?
4. What are the implications of missed edges?
1 How unsound are static call graphs?
To answer this question we developed four Android applications; one that we
expected FlowDroid to accurately create a call graph for and three we expected
to have missed edges. Our expectation was based on the notion that it may be
difficult for FlowDroid to correctly handle the three applications. For each of these
applications, we first run our modified version of FlowDroid to export the call graph
into a dot file.
The first application testSMS takes user input in the form of text and sends the
text via SMS when the button on the main screen is clicked. As a straightforward ap-
plication we expected FlowDroid to accurately create its call graph. The application
was on an emulator running our modified version of AOSP. We started the applica-
tion, typed random text and clicked on the button on the main screen. The log file
was then pulled(copied) from the emulator and used with the dot file as input to our
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1 <Button
2 android:layout_height="wrap_content"
3 android:layout_width="wrap_content"
4 android:id="@+id/button1"
5 android:text="@string/send_sms"
6 android:onClick="sendSMSMessage"
7 />
Figure 5·1: OnClickListener in the XML
1 sendBtn.setOnClickListener(new View.OnClickListener() {
2 public void onClick(View view) {
3 sendSMSMessage();
4 }
5 });
Figure 5·2: OnClickListener in the Java Code
tool. We were surprised to see that the methods called by the onClickListener were
in the missed edges list. To confirm that the edges were missed statically, we manually
checked the call graph created by FlowDroid. testSMS sets the OnClickListener in
the XML file(see Figure 5·1). Another way to set the OnClickListener is using the
Java code instead of the XML(see Figure 5·2). We modified the application and re-
moved the onClick from the XML and added it to the OnCreate method in the Java
code. We ran the experiment again and the result was that all edges were present as
originally expected. This indicates that a listener set in the XML of an application
will be missed but setting the listener in the Java code will result in a sounder result.
A sounder result would be one that misses less edges, in this case the callback from
the event onClick.
The second application Inception requires no user interaction. On startup, a
method First is called. First calls method secondCall that throws an exception
and in secondCall’s catch clause the method thirdCall is called (see Figure5·3
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1 public void secondCall()
2 {
3 try
4 {
5 int x=0;
6 int y=5/x;
7 }
8 catch(Exception e)
9 {
10 thirdCall();
11 }
12 }
Figure 5·3: Code from the second app, divide by zero exception
for the code). We ran this application through the same exercise as testSMS. Our
expectation for this application was that the edge from secondCall to thirdCall
would be missing. The expectation was based on the assumption that exception
handling in static analysis is hard Arzt et al. (2014). The result from EdgeAnalyzer
was that all edges were present.
In the third application, ToastMaster, we created a class Toaster that extends
Android’s Toast class. The Toast class allows developers to display short messages
to the user over the application. The message is displayed when the show() method
is called. We extended show() to send an SMS to our own number via a method
named surprise (see Figure 5·4). In the main application, when the button on the
main screen is clicked, an instance of Toaster is created and the show() method is
called. To avoid the missed edges due to onClickListener in the XML, we add the
code in Figure 5·2. We incorrectly assumed that FlowDroid’s call graph would not
contain the methods that send the SMS. The assumption was based on the idea that
reasoning about extended classes is hard. We ran this application through FlowDroid
and on our emulator we clicked on the button on the main screen. The call graphs
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1 public class Toaster extends Toast
2 {
3 private Context cntxt;
4 @Override
5 public void show()
6 {
7 surprise();
8 }
9 }
Figure 5·4: Code from the third app, extension of Toast class
were used as input to our tool and the result was that the edges were present in the
call graph.
For the fourth application, Exceptional, instead of extending a class from
the Android framework, we extend one from Java’s framework. We created
a class Exceptional that extends Java’s Exception class. Exception has a
method getMessage() that retrieves the exception’s detail message. We overwrite
getMessage() to retrieve the phone’s unique identifier number(IMEI) and send it by
SMS to our number. In the main application, an Exceptional is thrown and the
getMessage() is called (see Figure 5·5 for code). We again incorrectly assumed that
FlowDroid’s call graph would not contain the methods that get the IMEI number
and send the SMS. The assumption we made was based on the fact that reasoning
about exceptions and extended classes is hard. We ran this application through the
same exercise as the previous three applications. The result was that the edges were
present in the call graph.
The missed edge in the first application indicates a problem in parsing the layout
files. FlowDroid parses the file and so should be able to identify that there is a call
back registered for the onClick method.
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1 public class Exceptional extends Exception
2 {
3 TelephonyManager tel;
4 public Exceptional()
5 {
6 super();
7 }
8 public String getMessage(String t)
9 {
10 SmsManager smsManager = SmsManager.getDefault;
11 smsManager.sendTextMessage("6171234567",null,t,null,null);
12 return "hello world!";
13 }
14
15 }
Figure 5·5: Code from the fourth app, extension of Exception class
The result of the first application indicates that based on our definition of sound-
ness, that all edges in the application must be contained in the call graph, the call
graph created by FlowDroid is not sound. Based on the four applications, we can
claim that call graphs are unsound 25% of the time. However, a pool of four simple
applications does not indicate how unsound call graphs are in real world applications.
2 How widespread are missed edges in real world applications? We used a pool of
92 real world Android applications to test our tool. We downloaded these applications
from the PlayDrone repository Viennot et al. (2014).Playdrone crawls the Google Play
store to download applications and categorize them. The applications we chose were
from the ”Social” category. 19 of the 92 applications failed execution due to lack of
heap memory despite a size of 4GB. Our modified version of FlowDroid was run on
each of these applications to extract the call graph into a dot file. We used a fresh
emulator instance for each application. Android’s Monkey tool was run to simulate
user interaction on the emulator. Monkey is an application exerciser that randomly
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generates key strokes such as click or swipe.
For each of the applications, the application was installed on the running emulator
and Android’s Monkey program was run with 200 random key strokes. A key stroke
is an action that a user can make, for example a finger touching the screen at a
certain position. Since the key strokes are randomly selected, we wanted to ensure
maximum operations while simultaneously not overwhelming the application. We
tested different values for the number of key strokes and 200 was empirically chosen
as it gave us adequate coverage and simultaneously did not produce a log file that
was unreasonable large in size. At the end of the simulated interaction, the log file
containing the logged function calls was extracted from the emulator. An application’s
package name is written into the AndroidManifest.xml file. The package name is
used to identify the main package of the application for the categorization of edges.
We retrieved the application’s package name by using the Android Asset Packaging
Tool(aapt) on the APK file and then run our tool with the extracted log file, dot file
and the package name.
Using our automated statistics collector, we found that 62 applications have edges
missed in their static call graph (see Figure 5.1). This significantly changes the claim
of soundness of call graphs. Based on these results, the call graph is unsound 84.9%
of the time. This is not an indicator of vulnerabilities or malicious activity missed
but invalidates assumptions based on the soundness of call graphs.
3 What does categorization of missed edges reveal?
As explained in Chapter 4.4, we categorized all the edges that were missed. To
verify that edges are in the correct categories, we inspected 10 of the JSON files.
As expected, all edges were correctly categorized. To be able to quantify the missed
edges and their categories, we ran our statistics collecting tool, statTool. The results
of the collection are in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.1: App Statistics that show the number of applications with
specific categories of edges missed
From package to framework 61
From framework to package 52
In different packages 51
Within the main package 27
From framework to app 43
From app to framework 42
From ad library to framework 4
From ad framework to library 2
Within the ad library 2
Uncategorized edges 0
Total number of apps 73
Table 5.2 is ordered based on the most number of missed edges per category. The
categories framework to package and package to framework are related to the packages
that are not the main package. The numbers reveal that the majority of missed edges
are related to packages that are not the package declared in the AndroidManifest.xml
file. This indicates that the call graph does not accurately represent the interactions
with third party libraries. It is also evident that call graphs unsoundness is not limited
to a specific set of categories. This indicates that there is more than one cause for
the edges to be missed.
Table 5.2: The numbers of missed edges in the categories
Category of Missed Edges Total
Package To Framework 9,907
Inter-package 6,323
App To Android Framework 1,067
Framework To Package 803
Class To Class 483
Android Framework To App 430
App To Java Framework 324
Ad To Framework 108
Same Class 106
Ad To Ad 36
Framework To Ad 10
Java Framework To App 1
Other 0
Total 19,653
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Figure 5·6: Distribution of missed edges per app
Figure 5·6 is a graphical representation of the number of missed edges per appli-
cation. The vertical axis represents number of edges missed by the static call graph.
The graph shows us that 59 of the 73 applications have less than 500 edges missing
and that one application has more than 2000 edges missing.
4 What are the implications of missed edges?
To determine the cause of the missed edges, we manually checked a few of the
results to verify our expectations of finding missed edges that could potentially alter
the results of an analysis. Categories that we identified as interesting were inter-
package edges and intra main package edges. We looked into two applications with
intra main package edges, that is intra-class and inter-class. One of the two applica-
tions missed edges that were related to the onClick issue we mentioned earlier. Thus
our take-away observation is that the parsing of the layout files should be improved
to handle the case. The second application’s missed edge was unrelated to a callback
method. The initial verification was done by looking at the file with the log of traced
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ar.com.indiesoftware.peoplesay.android.PeopleSayApplication:
boolean hasNetworkActivity()
->
ar.com.indiesoftware.peoplesay.android.services.DataService:
int getConnections()
Figure 5·7: Missed edge from an application
edges. The edge that was missed is shown in Figure 5·7. The edge missed has a
start vertex of method hasNetworkActivity() from class PeopleSayApplication
and end vertex of method getConnections() from class DataService. On manual
inspection, we verified that the vertex hasNetworkActivity() belongs to the static
call graph. To verify the existence of the methods in the application code, we used
apktool to disassemble the application. Once verified, we used the Dex2jar tool to
decompile the application and find an explanation for the missed edges. Figure 5·8
shows that the method getConnections() is called based on the condition that the
object service exists. An assumption for the missed edge could be that the object
service is never set and therefore the analysis correctly assumes that the method
call getConnections() will never be called. Our dynamic call graph shows that this
assumption is incorrect. Based on our results, the object exists and the method is
called. This indicates that analysis that looks into data-flow by propagating taint
(such as FlowDroid) will inaccurately miss propagating through this edge.
We identified 27 applications with edges within the application itself, using the
same package, that are missed statically but found dynamically(see Table 5.1). The
two examples above fit into this category of applications.
We picked three application with missed edges from a package other than the
package declared in the AndroidManifest.xml file. We disassembled the applications
using apktool to see whether the code for the packages were dynamically loaded. A
package that is dynamically loaded will be included in the application during runtime
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1 public boolean hasNetworkActivity()
2 {
3 boolean bool2 = false;
4 boolean bool1 = bool2;
5 if (this.service != null)
6 {
7 bool1 = bool2;
8 if (this.service.getConnections() != 0) {
9 bool1 = true;
10 }
11 }
12 return bool1;
13 }
Figure 5·8: The code
and therefore its edges cannot be found by static analysis tools. All three applications
statically linked the third party packages. In other words, we could see the package
code in the disassembled application. This means it was not dynamically loaded and
should have been part of the static call graph. An issue with third party libraries
is the fact that the library shares the application’s permissions. Knowing that edges
from statically linked third party libraries could be missed indicates that there needs
to be a more thorough examination of static code with reference to these libraries.
Our observation is that the handling of statically linked third party libraries needs to
be improved to correctly assess an application statically.
We state that any edge observed dynamically but not present in the static call
graph is a witness for unsoundness. The set of edges we observed dynamically but
were not present in the static call graph is a lower bound of edges. The analysis
shows that the call graphs were unsound 84.9% of the time. The categorization of
the missed edges highlighted three main issues. The first issue is the analysis of third
party libraries statically linked to the application. The second issue is the incorrect
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handling of the onClick callback from the layout files. The third issue is the missed
edge due to the incorrect assumption of a condition never being met. All three issues
should be handled correctly to obtain a sounder call graph. An unsound call graph
will render assumptions based on its soundness invalid. Therefore the conclusions
derived from a static analysis tool will also be unsound.
Chapter 6
Related Work
The following is a discussion of related scientific literature in the areas of program
analysis and analysis tools. We present various tools in static and dynamic analysis
of Android applications. Our work has benefited from related work and is also com-
plimentary to it. Our focus is on finding and highlighting gaps in static analysis tools
for further development efforts to focus on.
Soot Valle´e-Rai et al. (1999) is a tool used by researchers and developers to develop
static analysis tools for Java programs. A key feature of the Soot framework is
its support for implementing intra-procedural data-flow analyses. This includes the
generation of call graphs using Soot’s construction algorithms through which call
graph information is provided. Soot uses an over-approximation of the set of calls
that may occur at runtime to compute, for each call, all possible targets of that call
site. Soot generates call graphs of Java code. Since Android is programmed in Java,
it can, and has been used to generate call graphs for Android applications. These call
graphs can be used as input to our tool to identify areas of unsoundness.
FlowDroid Arzt et al. (2014) is a precise context, flow, field, object-sensitive and
lifecycle-aware static analysis tool. FlowDroid extends soot to create the call graphs.
FlowDroid handles the complexity of not having a standard main method in an An-
droid application by creating a dummy main method based on the components it finds
in the application. It assumes that any of these components may be the starting point
of the application. It attaches callbacks to these components. To find the callbacks
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registered to each component, FlowDroid creates a call graph for each one. Then each
call graph is scanned iteratively to find and add callbacks to the graph. This recursive
step stops when no more callbacks are added to any of these call graphs. FlowDroid
then performs taint propagation on these call graphs to find sensitive flows. We have
shown that FlowDroid does not handle certain instances of callback methods. For
example, if a developer decides to set the onClick listener in one of the XML files
of the application, this callback and any edges with this method as a source will be
missing from the call graph.
Amandroid Wei et al. (2014) is an inter-component data flow analysis framework.
The developers shy away from the traditional extension of well known tools such
as soot Octeau et al. (2010) and write a decompiler. Amandroid produces a highly
precise flow and context sensitive inter-procedural control flow graph (ICFG) of an
application. Amandroid includes Inter-component communication edges which our
tool also finds. The developers create and use a inter-component data flow graph and
a data dependency graph to find sensitive flows. The difference between Amandroid
and EdgeAnalyzer is that they focus on a specific flow issue, inter-component data
flow, where we are looking at the call graph that can lead to different types of missed
flows.
EdgeMiner Cao et al. (2015) is a tool that finds implicit control flows through
the Android framework. The authors extend FlowDroid as an example of how their
tool can be integrated into a static analysis tool. The way flows are calculated in
FlowDroid is by using taint propagation on the call graph. It can be extrapolated
that without the edge in the call graph, any flow that passes through that edge will be
missed. EdgeMiner creates a call graph of the framework instead of the application to
perform inter-procedural data flow analysis. The developers note that their procedure
does not guarantee precision when it comes to reflection and native code. Due to the
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dynamic analysis done in our tool, we can capture these edges under the condition
that the execution path taken during the run calls the methods.
IccTA Li et al. (2015) is an open-source static taint analysis tool focusing on
communications between an Android application’s components to detect sensitive
personal data leaks. The main premise of IccTA is that analyzing components sep-
arately (Intra-components) is not enough since much of the communication and in-
formation exchange is happening between components. Thus, IccTA implements an
inter-components communication analysis. IccTA transforms an application’s Dalvik
bytecode into Jimple representation, then extracts the inter-components communica-
tion links and other related data, and connects the components. To handle lifecycle
and callback methods, IccTA generates a ”dummymain” method for each compo-
nent to use in the analysis. It then uses a modified version of FlowDroid to build
a control flow graph of the application and performs the static taint analysis using
stored context information such as the values of intents. Declared limitations of IccTA
are failure in resolving reflective calls if their arguments are implicit, unawareness of
multi-threading, inability to handle native calls and complicated string operations,
and excessive memory consumption. Implicit arguments are defined at runtime and
therefore it is difficult to reason about them statically. Since IccTA uses FlowDroid,
any unsoundness in FlowDroid can be propagated. EdgeAnalyzer has already iden-
tified three areas where FlowDroid’s call graph is unsound. This unsoundness will
render any assumptions IccTA make based on FlowDroid’s soundness invalid.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this thesis, we designed and implemented a tool, EdgeAnalyzer, to find and cat-
egorize edges missed in the call graphs of Android static analysis tools. We used
dynamic analysis to find edges missed in the creation of static call graphs. We iden-
tified unsoundness in call graphs of a state of the art static analysis tool.
Our approach was to modify a static analysis tool to output static call graphs,
and modify AOSP to output dynamic call graphs. We used our tool to map the edges
of the two call graphs and find missing edges from the static call graph and then
categorize them.
We modified FlowDroid, a state of the art precise context, flow, field, object-
sensitive, and lifecycle-aware static analysis tool for Android applications Arzt et al.
(2014), to print its call graph to a dot file. We used our modified AOSP version to
print dynamic call graphs. We used 92 real world Android applications and ran them
through the modified versions of FlowDroid and AOSP to generate their static and
dynamic call graphs. Using the tool we developed, we successfully showed that there
are areas of unsoundness in the static call graph created in FlowDroid. We discussed
the implications of the results we found from real world applications. We created a
tool that can be used to identify areas of weakness in the creation of call graphs for
Android application.
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